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Abstract:  
We analyze the empirical relationship between opportunistic fraud and business cycle. 
We find that residual opportunistic fraud exists both in the contract with replacement cost 
endorsement and the contract with no-deductible endorsement in the Taiwan automobile 
theft insurance market. These results are consistent with previous literature on the 
relationship between fraud activity and insurance contracting. We also show that the 
severity of opportunistic fraud fluctuates in the opposite direction to the business cycle. 
Opportunistic fraud is stimulated during periods of recession and mitigated during 
periods of expansion. 
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 1 
Does opportunistic fraud in automobile theft insurance fluctuate 
with the business cycle? 
 
1. Introduction 
Insurance fraud has become an increasingly important issue throughout the world. Many 
researchers have investigated this problem. Nonetheless, few studies have examined the 
relationship between fraud and the surrounding environment.
1
 This paper fills this gap and 
investigates the impact of the environment on fraud from a macroeconomic standpoint. It 
underlines the impact of the business cycle on insurance fraud. To our knowledge, insurance 
fraud has never been directly linked to any macroeconomic factors in the literature. 
Dionne (2000) provides many reasons for insurance fraud, such as changes in morality, 
poverty, intermediaries’ behavior, insurers’ attitude, and nature of insurance contracts. Although it 
has been pointed out that morality or poverty could affect insurance fraud,
2
 no studies have 
provided related empirical evidence. However, fraud has been associated with morality, and 
morality has been linked to a country’s poverty level. In addition, the poverty level of society is 
commonly linked to economic circumstances. 
Dionne and Gagné (2002) find a particular pattern of claim timing in Quebec’s automobile 
insurance contracts and conclude that opportunistic fraud is induced by the replacement cost 
endorsement. Dionne and Gagné (2001) also show how insurance fraud is affected by the 
deductible level in insurance contracts. Similarly, our contribution posits that opportunistic fraud 
                                                 
1
 Boyer (2001) is one of the few researchers to discuss the impact of economic factors on insurance fraud, 
specifically that of the tax scheme of the insurance benefit. See also Bates et al.’s (2010) study of health production 
efficiency. 
2
 Dionne and Gagné (2002) underline that poverty is a possible reason for fraud. In the theoretical model of Dionne, 
Giuliano, and Picard (2009), the moral cost of fraud is one of the factors that affect individuals’ decision to defraud. 
 2 
is induced by the nature of the insurance contract, and further explores the impact of the business 
cycle. 
It is unclear whether the business cycle has a positive or negative impact on insurance fraud. 
From the risk aversion standpoint, people could become more risk-averse and hesitate to play this 
type of lottery by committing fraud when an economic recession reduces their wealth level. 
Conversely, the morality standard could decrease when the economic situation worsens. The 
marginal benefit from fraud could also increase while the wealth level decreases during a 
recession, and the incentive to defraud could increase. Hence, competing predictions on the 
relationship between the business cycle and insurance fraud are worth testing. 
Insurance fraud is an increasingly important problem in Taiwan. In automobile theft 
insurance, a significant line in the property-liability insurance market,
3
 the amount of fraud 
accounts for about 5% of total claims. It reached 150 million NT dollars in 2008.
4
 With the loss 
ratio of auto theft insurance at more than 35% each year, fraud could be one of the reasons for 
such a high loss ratio in this important business line. Further, the loss ratio fluctuates over time 
and coincides with the business cycle.
5
 
We have collected automobile theft insurance data from Taiwan’s largest property-liability 
insurance company.
6
 Our monthly data span a long policy period, comprising policies written in 
2000 to 2007, i.e. a study period of 96 policy months.
7
 We can thus test the relationship between 
opportunistic fraud and the business cycle. 
                                                 
3
 From 2000 to 2007, about 26.37% of private sedans were covered by theft insurance. The premium is over 40 
billion NT dollars (about 1.33 billion US dollars) per year, and the growth rate is about 10% per year. 
4
 This is roughly equivalent to 5 million US dollars. 
5
 If we treat GDP as a proxy variable for the fluctuation of business cycle, we find that the loss ratio of automobile 
theft insurance is significantly negative correlated with the level of GDP. We list the automobile theft insurance loss 
ratio of non-commercial vehicles and the GDP of Taiwan in Appendix A, from 1998 to 2009. The opposite 
relationship between the loss ratio and GDP is apparent. The significant correlation coefficient is -0.98896. 
6
 This insurance company controls more than 20% of Taiwan’s automobile insurance market. 
7
 For all the contracts written from 2000 to 2007, we collect their complete claim records for the policy year. For 
example, the claim records of policies written in 2007 are extended to the dates in 2008. 
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We find a particular pattern of total theft claim timing linked to the replacement cost 
endorsement. The month-by-month test
8
 indicates that unlike partial theft claims, total theft 
claims under replacement cost endorsement contracts increase over time during the contract year. 
This finding confirms that opportunistic fraud, rather than ex ante moral hazard, arises from the 
replacement cost endorsement. Further, testing by each policy month during the policy year 
points to another particular pattern of claim timing for opportunistic fraud induced by 
no-deductible endorsement. The total theft claims of no-deductible endorsement are more 
common during the early months of the contract year. This opportunistic fraud evidence can also 
be separated from ex ante moral hazard. 
Further, the empirical evidence affirms that opportunistic fraud fluctuates conversely with 
the business cycle. The claim timing patterns for the two types of contracts mentioned above are 
even more pronounced during a recession, which implies that a recession amplifies the incentives 
for opportunistic fraud induced by contracts. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section analyses the empirical hypotheses. The 
third section describes the data and the fourth section discusses the empirical methodology used 
in this paper. The fifth section presents the empirical results. The final section concludes the 
paper. 
2. Hypotheses 
Opportunistic fraud incentive is induced by the nature of the insurance contract.
9
 Two 
important contract types are replacement cost endorsement and no-deductible endorsement. We 
                                                 
8
 In this paper, the periods have been reorganized according to policy periods. Hence, we test policy months instead 
of calendar months. 
9
 Picard (2000) infers that the severity of insurance fraud ranges from build-up to planned criminal fraud. The 
opportunistic fraud we investigate in this paper is in the middle of the fraud spectrum. There are also many other 
contributions discussing the optimal contract design that could reduce the incentive to defraud. Crocker and Morgan 
(1998) theoretically investigate the optimal insurance contract under costly state falsification. Crocker and Tennyson 
(1999) empirically tested for the nature of the optimal insurance contract under costly falsification. Bond and 
Crocker (1997) and Boyer (2004) design the optimal insurance contract under costly state verification (see Derrig, 
 4 
posit that the degree of incentive to defraud is also affected by the business cycle. In this section, 
four hypotheses are proposed for the empirical tests. Before we explore the impact of the 
business cycle, the claim timing pattern of opportunistic fraud induced by each contract is 
identified.
10
 
There are many factors explaining opportunistic fraud.
11
 On the demand side, maximizing 
their expected utility, each insured has a critical value of the probability of a fraud being 
successful. The lower this critical value, the greater the insured’s incentive to commit fraud. One 
can show that this critical value decreases when the difference between the vehicle’s replacement 
cost and the vehicle’s market value increases near the expiration of the insurance contract. 
Accordingly, the insured would consider opportunistic fraud near the contract’s expiration with 
increasing probability. On the supply side, the probability of the insurer’s conducting an audit 
also decreases near the contract’s expiration because the market value of the vehicle decreases 
over time.
12
 Hence, as the theoretical model of Dionne and Gagné (2002) indicates, opportunistic 
fraud probability is higher near the expiration of the replacement cost endorsement. 
We also infer the probability of opportunistic fraud under such an equilibrium model. On the 
demand side, the individual’s expected utility model is similar to that of Dionne and Gagné 
(2002). On the supply side, we modify their insurer’s audit probability to become flat over time.13 
                                                                                                                                                              
2002, and Picard, 2000, for reviews of the literature). 
10
 Identifying the existence of fraud under asymmetric information is an important aim in the literature. For example, 
Artis et al. (2002) adopt a new methodology to identify fraud by allowing the misclassification error in the existing 
method to separate fraudulent claims from honest claims. 
11
 Picard (1996) built an equilibrium model between the insurer and the insured to explain the successful fraud 
probability in the market. Dionne and Gagné (2002) extended this model. The result is that auditing is not sufficient 
to deter fraud. Hence, the success probability of fraud does not correspond to the probability of non-audit. 
12
 The stringency of audit could affect the success probability of fraud, but it is not constant over time. Dionne, 
Giuliano and Picard (2009) use red flags as the signals for conducting stringent audit in their optimal auditing 
strategy. Dionne and Gagné (2002) assume that the stringency of audit decreases near the expiration of the 
replacement cost endorsement. 
13
 We make this assumption because insurers in Taiwan do not, in practice, implement a particularly stringent audit 
at the beginning of the contract. First, the market value of a vehicle does not vary as much as in Quebec from the 
beginning to the end of the overall policy period, because the contract length is only for one year, and the 
replacement cost endorsement contract is not designed for new vehicles exclusively in Taiwan. Second, insurance 
 5 
The theoretical model under replacement cost endorsement is presented in Appendix B. The main 
result is consistent with Dionne and Gagné (2002) in that the equilibrium fraud probability is 
higher near the end of the policy year. 
When we study opportunistic fraud induced by the replacement cost endorsement contract in 
the empirical test, this contract is compared with the reference contract with both depreciation 
and deductible. We treat the contract with deductible and replacement cost endorsement as a 
high-coverage contract, and the reference contract as a low-coverage contract. A contract with 
replacement cost endorsement reimburses the total value of the car evaluated at the beginning of 
the contract period. The former exhibits the claim timing pattern described above, whereas the 
latter does not. Hence, our first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: If the claims are induced by opportunistic fraud, individuals who choose a 
replacement cost endorsement contract have a higher probability of filing a claim, and this 
probability is even higher near the end of the contract period. 
In addition, we examine incentives to defraud induced by the no-deductible endorsement 
contract. Dionne and Gagné (2001) propose a theoretical model and empirically verify that the 
design of the deductible would increase the incentive to build up a claim. However, this 
conclusion cannot be applied directly to our research design because we investigate opportunistic 
fraud rather than build-up. People putatively build up claims to exceed the deductible threshold in 
the insurance contract after the event has occurred. Hence, the design of a deductible would 
encourage the incentive to build up. If the event has not actually occurred, people would have a 
greater incentive to invent fraudulent claims when there is no deductible designed in the contract. 
The incentive of opportunistic fraud is therefore higher under a no-deductible endorsement. We 
                                                                                                                                                              
companies in Taiwan rely heavily on the mechanism of deductible design in the replacement cost endorsement and a 
more stringent depreciation rate in the no-deductible contract. There is actually no difference in the audit approach 
between the beginning and the end of the policy year as a whole. 
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derive this result in Appendix C. We also discuss the claim timing pattern for the contract with 
depreciation in Appendix C. While the vehicle depreciation from the insurer’s indemnity is much 
more stringent than that in the market, and when the incentive to cheat is large enough, the 
insured would have a stronger incentive to organize opportunistic fraud at the beginning of the 
contract period under a contract with depreciation. Hence, under a flat audit mechanism, the 
equilibrium fraud probability is higher at the beginning of the policy year. 
To identify opportunistic fraud induced by the no-deductible endorsement contract in our 
empirical test, we compare this contract with the reference contract, which comprises both a 
deductible and depreciation. The contract with depreciation and no-deductible endorsement is 
thus a high-coverage contract, and the reference contract is a low-coverage contract. As shown in 
Appendix C, the relative claim timing pattern is focused on the beginning months of the policy 
year. Our second hypothesis is therefore: 
Hypothesis 2: If the claims are induced by opportunistic fraud, individuals who choose the 
non-deductible endorsement contract have a higher probability of filing claims. This relative 
probability is even higher at the beginning of the contract period. 
Although the main research problem is opportunistic fraud, we cannot deny that the former 
parts of the above two hypotheses could also be the result of adverse selection. Under adverse 
selection, high-risk individuals tend to purchase the two types of high-coverage contracts and 
have a higher probability of making a claim. However, the claim would be equally distributed 
among the twelve months. In contrast, only opportunistic fraud would create a particular pattern 
in the timing of the claim during the months of the policy year. This characteristic enables us to 
clearly rule out adverse selection. Hence, when the first and second hypotheses are empirically 
sustained, they would provide evidence of opportunistic fraud rather than adverse selection. 
 7 
It is important to distinguish opportunistic fraud from ex ante moral hazard.
14
 Opportunistic 
fraud results from an individual’s decision to invent a fraudulent claim or not. Ex ante moral 
hazard arises from the decision to pay more or less attention to self-protection. Under the 
replacement cost endorsement, ex ante moral hazard could be stronger near the end of the policy 
year.
15
 Conversely, under the no-deductible endorsement contract, ex ante moral hazard could be 
stronger at the beginning of the policy year.
16
 Ex ante moral hazard thus has the same claim 
timing pattern as opportunistic fraud. 
Dionne and Gagné (2002) show that opportunistic fraud can be induced only when the 
benefit from fraud is sufficiently large. They maintain that the benefit from fraud based on partial 
theft is minor. The incentive to defraud through total theft is much stronger than that related to 
partial theft. This difference in incentives provides an opportunity to distinguish opportunistic 
fraud from ex ante moral hazard. Self-protection has an equal effect in terms of reducing the 
probability of both total theft and partial theft, but fraud solely leads to a stronger incentive to file 
a total theft claim. Accordingly, opportunistic fraud could emerge mainly based on the probability 
of a total theft claim instead of a partial theft claim. Hence, our third hypothesis is to distinguish 
opportunistic fraud from ex ante moral hazard. 
Hypothesis 3: If the claim timing patterns in the first and second hypotheses emerge only in 
relation to the total theft claim, opportunistic fraud exists rather than ex ante moral hazard. If the 
                                                 
14
 In the literature, the consequences of ex ante moral hazard and fraud are often mixed. For example, when Weiss et 
al. (2010) discussed the distortion effect of regulated insurance pricing, they mention that regulation could cause ex 
ante moral hazard because the safety investments of drivers may be diminished. This regulation could also cause 
fraudulent claims because the disincentive of filing fraudulent claims may also be reduced. 
15
 As described in Dionne and Gagné (2002), the benefits of prevention decrease over time under the replacement 
cost endorsement. Hence, the presence of replacement cost endorsement reduces self-protection activities, increasing 
the probability of theft. 
16
 The depreciation rate used for the insurer’s indemnity is more stringent than that in the regular market. Hence, the 
difference between the loss indemnity and the vehicle’s market value would be larger near the end of the year. This 
would give the insured more incentive to pay more attention to self-protection and to reduce the ex ante moral hazard 
near the end of the year. Accordingly, under a no-deductible contract, there is greater ex ante moral hazard at the 
beginning of the policy year. 
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above patterns also emerge relative to the partial theft claim, then ex ante moral hazard may 
exist in the market, and we cannot conclusively determine whether opportunistic fraud exists. 
Investigating the impact of the business cycle on opportunistic fraud is the second objective 
of this research. Whether opportunistic fraud will fluctuate consistently or inversely with the 
business cycle is unclear. 
Regarding risk aversion, it has been accepted that most people are risk-averse and exhibit 
decreasing absolute risk aversion. In an economic recession, people’s wealth decreases and they 
become more risk-averse. This will make them more hesitant to adopt risky actions, including 
fraud. Hence, the probability of opportunistic fraud could decrease during a recession. 
Alternatively, because the individual’s wealth decreases during a recession, the increment of 
utility from the benefit of fraud increases concomitantly. Furthermore, if recession reduces 
individuals to the poverty level, they may feel they have much less to lose if they get caught 
committing fraud. This may increase people’s likelihood of defrauding during a recession. 
Fraud is highly related to an individual’s morality . Morality may also vary with wealth level. 
Husted et al. (1999) argue that societal corruption is highly related to GNP per capita. They 
provide empirical evidence that indirectly shows that individuals’ morality level is positively 
related to their wealth. Dionne, Giuliano and Picard (2009) establish in a theoretical model that 
moral cost is a factor that affects individuals’ decision to defraud. Therefore, from the standpoint 
of morality, recession reduces the average wealth level. A lower wealth level could weaken 
morality and reduce the moral cost of fraud, which raises the probability of fraud. Because our 
fourth hypothesis encompasses two conflicting effects, we do not make a prediction on the sign 
of the effect. 
Hypothesis 4: Opportunistic fraud could be positively or negatively affected by the business 
cycle. 
 9 
3. Data 
Our data set includes all the characteristics of the insured and the insured vehicles, such as 
the gender, age, marital status of the insured; the brand, age, size, registered area, usage purpose 
of the insured vehicle; the information on the contract, such as coverage; the selling channel of 
the contract; and the claim information for each policy. Regarding the claim information, we 
collect not only the records on the claim amount and reason, but also the records on the date of 
the claim. This could help identify the timing of the claim, specifically the policy month during 
the policy period. 
Further, we use the corresponding calendar date to investigate the impact of the business 
cycle. Our policy data are reorganized by policy year, and the claim timing is described by policy 
month, whereas the business cycle index is recorded by calendar year and calendar month. 
Accordingly, because we investigate the relationship between business cycle and opportunistic 
fraud for each policy month, we match the calendar date of the claim to the corresponding 
calendar month in the monthly business cycle index. 
The data examined comprise the policies written from 2000 to 2007 and their corresponding 
claims until the end of 2008. This length of data allows us to match the monthly variation in the 
macroeconomic business cycle index to test the relationship between opportunistic fraud and 
business cycle. Hence we use the corresponding business cycle index of a potential claim’s 
calendar month to measure the effect of the business cycle. 
The business cycle index is the trend-adjusted monthly index of the composite coincident 
index from January 2000 to December 2008. This index, obtained from the published data of the 
Council for Economic Planning and Development of Taiwan, reflects the fluctuations of the 
business cycle. The value of the index is higher when the economy is healthier, and vice versa. 
 10 
The total number of observations in our data set is 1,761,536. When we test whether 
opportunistic fraud exists under the replacement cost endorsement, we use a sub-sample of 
replacement cost endorsement contracts together with contracts with deductible and depreciation. 
The number of observations in this sub-sample is 1,715,736. When we test whether opportunistic 
fraud exists under no-deductible contracts, we use the sub-sample of no-deductible contracts plus 
contracts with deductible and depreciation. The number of observations in this sub-sample is 
1,170,012. Because we cannot observe the occurrence of partial theft for the contracts without the 
endorsement of auto parts accessories, we can use only a smaller sub-sample of contracts with the 
endorsement of auto parts accessories when we test the relationship between coverage and claim 
timing for the partial theft case. This smaller sub-sample comprises 564,175 observations. 
Observing the basic statistics of the variables in our empirical data can help us understand 
the data characteristics and their representativeness. The variables are defined in Table 1. The 
descriptive statistics for these variables are listed in Table 2. A total of 32.92% of theft insurance 
policies involve replacement cost endorsement, and only about 2.48% of the policies have zero 
deductible. About 40% of the policies are sold through dealer-owned agents. 
Regarding the structure of the insured individuals, most of the insured (91.23%) are married, 
between 30 and 60 years old (87.97%), and female (62.55%). As for the structure of the insured 
vehicles, 64.27% of the insured vehicles have engine capacities equal to or less than 2000 c.c., 
and 39.29% of the insured vehicles are concentrated in the most popular brand in the market. 
Concerning vehicle distribution across the registered areas, 47.95% are registered in the north, 
27.84% in the south, and 2.29% in the east of Taiwan. 53.51% of the vehicles are registered in 
cities. 
About 20% of the vehicles are brand new, and more than 70% are less than four years old. A 
total of 96.43% of the insured vehicles are non-commercial or long-term rental sedans. These 
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characteristics indicate that people are more willing to purchase theft insurance for vehicles for 
non-commercial use and for new vehicles. 
4. Empirical methodology 
The first empirical task in this paper is to identify whether opportunistic fraud exists in the 
automobile theft insurance market in Taiwan. We test the evidence for fraud based on the timing 
pattern of the conditional correlation between coverage and claims. The contract with high 
coverage is defined as either the replacement cost endorsement or no-deductible contract. The 
claim is further identified as the total theft claim and partial theft claim. 
To test the conditional correlation between coverage and claims, we use a two-stage method 
similar to the methodology for a conditional correlation analysis in Dionne, Gouriéroux and 
Vanasse (2001). To identify the time pattern of the conditional correlation between coverage and 
claim, we test their conditional correlation by policy month. Hence, in each model,
17
 we conduct 
the following conditional correlation test on twelve pairs from the first policy month to the 
twelfth policy month. 
The two-stage method is as follows. In the first stage, we estimate the claim probability of 
the j-th policy month for each policy by means of the Probit regression 
 )()1(Prob 111 jkititjkit XXclaim  ,  12,...1j , ptk , , ni ,..1 ,  
2007,...2000t  (1) 
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 When we identify the existence of opportunistic fraud, we test the conditional correlation between claim and 
coverage under four models. In the first model, we test the conditional correlation between total theft claim and 
coverage of contract with replacement cost endorsement. In the second model, we test the conditional correlation 
between total theft claim and coverage of contract with no-deductible endorsement. In the third model, we test the 
conditional correlation between partial theft claim and coverage of contract with replacement cost endorsement. In 
the fourth model, we test the conditional correlation between partial theft claim and coverage of contract with 
no-deductible endorsement. When we identify the relationship between opportunistic fraud and business cycle, we 
test under two additional models. In the fifth model, we test the effect of the business cycle on the conditional 
correlation between total theft claim and the coverage of contract with replacement cost endorsement. In the sixth 
model, we test the effect of the business cycle on the conditional correlation between total theft claim and the 
coverage of contract with no-deductible endorsement. 
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where )(Prob   denotes the probability function,   is the cumulative standard normal 
distribution function, ni ,,1 , denotes the observations. The observations represent an 
unbalanced panel from policy year 2000 to policy year 2007. k = t is for total claim and k = p is 
for partial claim. 
1itX  is the vector of explanatory variables that includes the characteristics of 
the insured and the insured vehicle, which are listed in Table 1. Some of the explanatory variables, 
such as sex, age of insured, and age of the insured vehicle, are invariant during policy years. 
Other explanatory variables could vary over policy years; these include registered area of vehicle, 
marriage status, and policy year variable. jk1  is the corresponding parameter vector, and 
jkitclaim  is the variable identifying whether the insured claimed or not. jkitclaim  is defined by 
policy month (j), from first policy month to 12
th
 policy month of the whole policy year, for each 
insured i. 1jkitclaim  when insured i has filed a claim in j -th policy month of policy year t, 
otherwise 0jkitclaim . 
In the second stage, we run the other Probit regression for the probability of purchasing a 
high-coverage contract as: 
 
))(ˆ(
))(ˆ,,1(covProb
,,,,,,22
2
jkitjlecjkitjlcjlit
jkitjkititlit
claimboPrclaimX
claimboPrclaimXerage
 

 (2) 
This regression is also based on the standard normal distribution used to estimate the 
probability of purchasing high coverage. The variable 
litcoverage  is a choice variable of the 
insured; namely whether he or she purchased a high-coverage contract or not in policy year t. 
There are two definitions of high coverage (l) in this paper: NDRl , , which denotes the 
replacement cost endorsement, and the no-deductible contract, respectively. The reference 
contracts are the contracts with depreciation and deductibles. They are defined as low-coverage. 
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itX 2  is the vector of explanatory variables that contains the same variables as in itX1 . jkitclaim  
has been defined above, and ˆ ( )jkitProb claim  is the estimated probability of jkitclaim . 
jlecjlcjl ,,,,,,2 ,,   are the corresponding parameter vectors for the estimation under each policy 
month j, and when we investigate the high-coverage contract as l=R or l=ND. The key estimated 
coefficient used to test the problems of asymmetric information is jlc ,, . There is a significantly 
positive correlation between the l coverage and claim in j-th policy month if the estimated jlc ,,  
is significantly positive. 
To disentangle opportunistic fraud from ex ante moral hazard, we test the conditional 
correlation between coverage and total theft claim, and between coverage and partial theft claim. 
Hence, the claim in the above two regressions is further defined according to total claim (k=t) or 
partial claim (k=p). When we conduct the above test for the conditional correlation between 
coverage and total theft claim, we can use the observations from the full sample. When we 
conduct the above test for the conditional correlation between coverage and partial theft claim, 
we can use only a sub-sample of insured who have also purchased the auto parts accessories 
endorsement. Because we are estimating total theft claims, we test only for the existing effective 
contracts in each policy month. In other words, the contracts for which total claims have been 
filed are terminated and eliminated from our sample. 
According to the first hypothesis, we test for the total theft claim (k=t) and replacement 
endorsement (l=R). If the estimated jlc ,, , l=R in equation (2) is significantly positive only for 
some j-th policy months near the end of the policy year, it indicates moral hazard instead of pure 
adverse selection. Opportunistic fraud could be induced by the replacement cost endorsement. 
According to the second hypothesis, we test for the total theft claim (k=t) and no-deductible 
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endorsement (l=ND). If the estimated jlc ,, , l=ND in equation (2) is significantly positive only 
for some j-th policy months occurring early in the policy year, this points to moral hazard instead 
of pure adverse selection. Opportunistic fraud could thus be induced by the no-deductible 
endorsement. 
When the particular time pattern emerges, we distinguish opportunistic fraud from ex ante 
moral hazard. According to the third hypothesis, we test the partial theft claim (k=p) for 
replacement cost endorsement (l=R) as well as for no-deductible endorsement (l=ND). If 
estimated jlc ,, s in equation (2) for all twelve policy months ( 12,...1j ) in the policy year are 
insignificant, we can infer that the emerging claim timing patterns are evidence of opportunistic 
fraud instead of ex ante moral hazard. 
We now have to test the relationship between opportunistic fraud and the business cycle. We 
can also test this relationship through a two-stage method. We keep the regression in the first 
stage unchanged. We then add the business cycle index to the explanatory variables in the 
regression of the second stage: 
 
))(ˆ(
))(ˆ,,,1(covProb
,,,,,,,,22
2
jkitjlecmjkitjlBCjkitjlCjlit
jkitmjkitjkititlit
claimboPrBuscycclaimclaimX
claimboPrBuscycclaimclaimXerage
 

 (3) 
mBuscyc  is the monthly business cycle index, which corresponds to each calendar month in 
each year with a potential claim. In our paper, the claim records are ranged among 108 months 
from January 2000 to December 2008, and are ranked from “0100” to “1208”.18 We match each 
of the claim dates in our sample to its corresponding calendar date, and find the corresponding 
month for mBuscyc . mBuscyc  is introduced as an interaction term with jkiclaim . The key 
                                                 
18
 The first two codes of m represent the calendar month, and the second two codes of m represent the calendar year. 
For example, m=0100 is for the business cycle index of January 2000. 
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coefficients used to measure the relationship between opportunistic fraud and the business cycle 
for contract l  are jlBC ,, s during some j-th policy months. According to our fourth hypothesis, 
the opportunistic fraud rate could rise or decline with the recession according to either of the two 
conflicting effects. If fraud is more severe in a recession, for high coverage contract representing 
contracts with replacement cost endorsement, the jlBC ,, s (l=R) in equation (3) should be 
significantly negative only for those j-th policy months near the end of the whole policy year; for 
high coverage contracts representing the no-deductible contract, the jlBC ,, s (l=ND) in equation 
(3) should be significantly negative only for those j-th policy months at some beginning months 
of the policy year. This indicates that opportunistic fraud is more severe while the economy is in 
a recession. Conversely, if the estimated jlBC ,, s are significantly positive in the 
above-mentioned policy months, this affirms that opportunistic fraud is more severe while the 
economy is booming. Finally, if all the estimated jlBC ,, s are insignificant, the business cycle has 
no impact on opportunistic fraud. 
5. Empirical results 
The first empirical task is to identify whether opportunistic fraud exists in the automobile 
theft insurance market in Taiwan. We try to disentangle ex post moral hazard from adverse 
selection and ex ante moral hazard. 
Table 3 shows that for total theft claims, the estimated jlc ,, s (l=R) are significantly positive 
only after the sixth policy month of the contract in the subsample of replacement cost 
endorsement contracts versus the reference contracts; the estimated jlc ,, s (l=ND) are 
significantly positive only before the third policy month of the contract in the subsample of 
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no-deductible endorsement contracts versus the reference contracts.
19
 The conditional 
correlations between coverage and claims exhibit significant time patterns under both contracts 
for total theft claims. The former finding is consistent with that of Dionne and Gagné (2002), and 
supports our first hypothesis. The second finding sustains the particular condition in our second 
hypothesis and its inference. Hence, these outcomes provide evidence only for the possible 
existence of opportunistic fraud rather than adverse selection. 
In the case of partial theft claims, all of the estimated jlc ,, s are not significant in both 
subsamples, meaning that the conditional correlations between coverage and partial theft claims 
are all insignificant. These outcomes preclude the existence of ex ante moral hazard and confirm 
the evidence of opportunistic fraud. Therefore, our third hypothesis is supported. All the 
outcomes, which support the first to third hypotheses, confirm that opportunistic fraud is induced 
by the two contract characteristics: replacement cost endorsement and no-deductible 
endorsement. 
Regarding the test associated with the business cycle, the empirical results of the estimated 
coefficients of jlC ,,  and jlBC ,,  in the second stage are listed in Table 4.
20
 Because the test 
here is to identify the impact of the business cycle on opportunistic fraud, we need only test this 
relationship for total theft claims.  
                                                 
19
 There are 48 pairs of regressions when we test the conditional correlation between two dimensions of claim (total 
theft claim as well as partial theft claim) and two dimensions of coverage (the coverage of contracts with 
replacement cost endorsement as well as the coverage of contracts with no-deductible endorsement). It is redundant 
to report complete results for all 48 pairs of regressions. Hence, we display only 48 key estimated coefficients ( jlc ,, ) 
from the second-stage regression in Table 3, and report two examples of ensuing regression results in Appendix D. 
20
 There are 24 pairs of regressions when we test the relationship between business cycle and opportunistic fraud. 
For similar reasons as before, it is redundant to report complete results for all 24 pairs of regressions. Hence, we 
display only the key estimated coefficients ( jlC ,,  and jlBC ,, ) from the second-stage regression in Table 4, and 
report two examples of these coefficients in Appendix E. 
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Table 4 demonstrates that under replacement cost endorsement, all of the estimated jlBC ,, s 
(l=R) are negative and are significant only after the 10th policy month. The estimated jlC ,, s 
retained their time pattern: they are significantly positive only for policy months near the end of 
the first policy year. Under a no-deductible contract (l=ND), all the estimated jlBC ,, s are still 
negative; they are significant only in the first two policy months. These outcomes mean that the 
conditional correlation between coverage and claim is stronger when economic conditions are 
deteriorating. The claim timing patterns for these types of contracts are reinforced by the business 
cycle. Such empirical evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that opportunistic fraud 
increases during a recession. The business cycle accentuates the timing pattern of the two 
contracts. 
6. Conclusion 
The main goal of this paper was to investigate the impact of the business cycle on 
opportunistic fraud. Few studies have associated the fraud problem with the surroundings, and 
none have discussed the impact of the business cycle on the severity of fraud. We find that 
opportunistic fraud is more severe during a recession. 
We also test whether opportunistic fraud could be induced by different kinds of insurance 
contracts. We confirm that there are particular time patterns for total theft claims induced by 
replacement cost endorsement and no-deductible endorsement. We separate this evidence from 
adverse selection. We also find that these particular claim timing patterns exist only in total theft 
claims, as opposed to partial theft claims. This additional evidence serves to differentiate 
opportunistic fraud from ex ante moral hazard. These conclusions corroborate the finding of 
Dionne and Gagné (2002). 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: The relationship between Taiwan’s auto theft insurance loss ratio of 
non-commercial vehicles and GDP 
Year Loss ratio GDP 
1998 66.93 9,204,174 
1999 62.67 9,649,049 
2000 54.38 10,187,394 
2001 56.64 9,930,387 
2002 54.81 10,411,639 
2003 49.55 10,696,257 
2004 47.83 11,365,292 
2005 45.87 11,740,279 
2006 39.47 12,243,471 
2007 35.72 12,910,511 
2008 36 12,698,501 
2009 36.83 12,512,678 
Note: The yearly loss ratio data come from the Taiwan Insurance Institute. The yearly GDP data 
come from the Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, 
R.O.C. The unit of GDP is million NT dollars. We estimated the correlation coefficient 
between the loss ratio and GDP for these twelve years. The correlation coefficient is 
-0.98896, and is significantly different from 0 at 1% of significance level. 
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Appendix B: Opportunistic fraud under replacement cost endorsement 
Assume that the consumer is risk-averse. The expected utility of an insured is equal to 
)()1()
)(
( WUgDA
th
A
WgU  , 
where U  is the utility function for the risk averse individual, W  is the person’s wealth, not 
including the value of the vehicle, A is the market value of the vehicle at the beginning of the 
policy year, )(th  is the depreciation rate for the market value of the vehicle, which is an 
increasing function of time t , and t  denotes the month of the policy year.   is the discount 
rate when the fraudulent individual sells his vehicle on the black market, 10  . D  is the 
deductible specified in the contract. g is the probability of the fraud being successful. 
The model assumes that the market value of the vehicle will be totally expropriated if the 
fraudulent behavior of the individual is discovered by the insurance company. This causes the 
wealth level of the fraudulent individual who is caught to be limited to W . 
The individual will defraud if 
)
)(
()()1()
)(
(
th
A
WUWUgDA
th
A
WgU  . 
There exists a critical value of the probability ( g~ ) at which there is indifference between 
being honest and dishonest: 
)
)(
()()~1()
)(
(~
th
A
WUWUgDA
th
A
WUg  . 
Furthermore, this critical value of the probability of the fraud being successful is: 
)()(
)()(~
)(
)(
WUDAWU
WUWU
g
th
A
th
A




. 
The expected utility function of an individual who has a probability ( ) of engaging in 
fraudulent behavior can therefore be written as:  
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()1()]()~1()
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A
WUWUgDA
th
A
WUgEU   . 
The individual has a probability equal to one of engaging in fraud when the probability of the 
fraud being successful is above g~ . On the contrary, the individual has a probability equal to zero 
of engaging in fraud when the probability of the fraud being successful is below g~ . In addition, 
there is a probability of fraud of between 1 and 0 when the probability of the fraud being 
successful is equal to g~ . To summarize, the probability of an individual engaging in fraud 
decreases with g~ . 
As time increases: 
2
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)()()(
)]()([
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~
2
WUDAWU
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dt
gd
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A
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A
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A
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

. 
We restate the denominator ( den ) of the above equation as: 
)()(
)(
WUDAWUden
th
A   , 
2( )
( ) ( )2
( ) ( )
( )
{[ ( ) ( )] ( )
( )
[ ( ) ( )] ( )} '( ).
A
h t A A
h t h t
A A
h t h t
dg
U W U W U W A D
dt den
U W A D U W U W h t
 

     
     
 
Because the incentive for an individual to engage in fraud is higher when 
)()( th
A
th
A DA  , the first set of square brackets is smaller than the second set in the above 
equation, and the first derivative of the utility under DAW
th
A 
)(
  is also smaller than the 
corresponding derivative under 
)(th
AW  . In addition,   is between 0 and 1. All of these factors 
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make the value inside the brackets negative. Moreover, 0)(  th , hence the sign of the above 
equation (
dt
gd~
) is negative. 
The above analysis infers that g~  will decrease with t , and that the probability   will 
increase with t . Hence, the probability of individual ( ) engaging in fraud is higher near the 
end of the policy year. If the audit probability of the insurance company is flat over the whole 
policy year, the equilibrium rate of fraud could also be higher near the end of the policy year.  
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Appendix C: Opportunistic fraud under the no-deductible contract 
First, we examine whether the incentive of opportunistic fraud is higher under a 
no-deductible endorsement. 
We still assume the individual is risk-averse, 
)()1()
)()(
( WUgD
tk
A
th
A
WgU  . 
Hence, the individual’s insurance contract is indemnified with depreciation. The depreciation 
rate ( )(tk ) increases with time t . Furthermore, the depreciation rate from the indemnity of the 
insurance company ( )(tk ) is more stringent than that in the market ( )(th ), i.e., )()( thtk   and 
)()( 22 )(
1
)(
1 thtk
thtk
 t . The definitions of g , W ,  , and A  are the same as those in the 
model in Appendix B. The totally expropriated constraint is also the same as in Appendix B. 
There exists a critical value of the probability ( g~ ) of the fraud being successful at which 
there is indifference between being honest and dishonest: 
)
)(
()()~1()
)()(
(~
th
A
WUWUgD
tk
A
th
A
WUg  . 
Furthermore, this critical value of the probability of the fraud being successful is: 
2
1
)()(
)(
)()(
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



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As the deductible increases: 
0)(
)(
~
)()(2
2
1 


 DWU
dD
gd
tk
A
th
A . 
The above inequality means that the deductible increases, as does the critical value of the 
probability of successful fraud, while the incentive to defraud decreases. Hence, people who 
purchase no-deductible contracts have a stronger incentive to defraud. 
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We also discuss the claim timing pattern for the contract with depreciation but without 
deductible. The expected utility of an individual to defraud under such a contract is as follows: 
)()1()
)()(
( WUg
tk
A
th
A
WgU  . 
There exists a critical value of the probability of the fraud being successful ( g~ ) at which 
point the individual is indifferent between being honest and being dishonest: 
)
)(
()()~1()
)()(
(~
th
A
WUWUg
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A
th
A
WUg  . 
Furthermore, this critical value of the probability of the fraud being successful is: 
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g
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



. 
The expected utility function of an individual who has the probability ( ) of engaging in 
fraud is therefore expressed as follows:  
)
)(
()1()]()~1()
)()(
(~[
th
A
WUWUg
tk
A
th
A
WUgEU   . 
The individual has a probability of 1 of engaging in fraud when the probability of the fraud 
being successful is above g~ . On the contrary, the individual has a probability of 0 of engaging in 
fraud when the probability of the fraud being successful is below g~ . Finally, the individual has a 
probability of fraud of between 1 and 0 when the probability of the fraud being successful equals 
g~ . To summarize, the probability of the individual’s engaging in fraud decreases with g~ . As time 
increases: 
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We restate the denominator of the above equation as )()(
)()(
WUWUden
tk
A
th
A   , 
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Here, the first set of square brackets is smaller than the second set of square brackets and the 
first derivative of the utility function under 
)()( tk
A
th
AW   is smaller than the first derivative of 
the utility under 
)(th
AW  . However, the term ))()(( 22 )()( tkth tk
A
th
A   could be higher than the 
term ))(( 2)( thth
A  , which makes the value inside the brackets ambiguous. If the value of   is 
large enough so that: 
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the above condition will make the sign of 
dt
gd~
 positive. This condition is especially true when 
the depreciation for the indemnity provided by the insurance company is much higher than the 
depreciation in the market, i.e., )()( thtk   and )()( 22 )()( thtk th
A
tk
A  . 
The above inference implies that while the vehicle depreciation from the insurer’s indemnity 
is much more stringent than that in the market, if the incentive to cheat is large enough (the 
discount on vehicles sold on the black market ( 1 ) is not too high), g~  will increase with t , 
and   will decrease with t . Hence, the probability of individual ( ) engaging in fraud will be 
higher at the beginning of the contract period. If the probability of the insurance company 
conducting an audit remains flat over the whole of the policy year, the equilibrium rate of fraud 
may also be higher at the beginning of the policy year. 
Lastly, we discuss the relative claim timing pattern for the contract with depreciation and 
no-deductible endorsement in contrast to the reference contract. 
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We consider the impact of timing on the incentive induced by the no-deductible endorsement. 
In other words, we consider the impact of t  on 
dD
gd~
. Let 
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where DWR
tk
A
th
A 
)()(1
 , 
)(2 th
AWR  . The sign of this derivative is ambiguous. 
Because the term before the plus sign is negative, the term after the plus sign is positive, and the 
net value of these two terms are uncertain. Hence, if the term before the plus sign is larger than 
the latter , the above equation is negative. This means that the degree of critical value of fraud 
probability decreases from month to month during a policy year. In other words, the degree that 
no-deductible endorsement contracts create a relatively higher incentive to defraud decreases 
over time. This corresponds to the second part of our second hypothesis, which states that the 
probability of fraud (for no-deductible endorsement contracts) is higher at the beginning of the 
policy year. 
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Appendix D: Complete empirical results of the 12
th
 policy month of Model (1), and the 1
st
 
policy month of Model (2) 
 
Variables 
12
th
 policy month in model (1) 1
st
 policy month in model (2) 
1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 
 Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value 
Intercept -17.253 0.890 -0.481 <.0001 -18.772 0.845 -0.561 <.0001 
clm_hat   0.121 0.063   1.972 0.001 
clm_1   1.703 <.0001   0.894 0.022 
sexf -0.065 0.087 0.129 <.0001 -0.138 <.0001 0.226 0.008 
marria_ 0.067 0.290 -0.288 <.0001 -0.037 0.547 0.087 0.001 
age1 4.402 0.001 -0.812 0.036 3.379 0.995 -7.157 0.001 
age2 4.241 0.003 -0.398 0.293 3.085 0.995 -6.724 <.0001 
age3 3.957 0.007 -0.193 0.596 2.852 0.996 -6.411 <.0001 
age4 3.978 0.007 -0.228 0.534 2.883 0.996 -6.472 <.0001 
age5 -0.997 0.999 0.312 0.252 2.809 0.996 -6.231 <.0001 
carage0 0.673 0.011 0.164 <.0001 0.285 <.0001 -0.768 <.0001 
carage1 0.377 0.002 0.339 <.0001 0.257 <.0001 -0.340 0.032 
carage2 0.233 0.004 0.340 <.0001 0.256 <.0001 -0.454 0.004 
carage3 -0.032 0.771 0.265 <.0001 0.200 0.006 -0.361 0.004 
carage4 0.171 0.070 0.160 <.0001 0.157 0.045 -0.300 0.002 
city 0.100 0.009 -0.303 <.0001 0.083 0.041 -0.169 0.001 
north -0.143 0.003 0.931 <.0001 -0.295 0.000 0.565 0.002 
south 0.045 0.340 -1.298 <.0001 -0.089 0.055 0.162 0.004 
east -0.327 0.093 -1.283 <.0001 -0.060 0.591 0.345 <.0001 
tramak_n -0.021 0.943 0.776 <.0001 -5.230 0.988 10.338 0.001 
tramak_f -0.058 0.386 -0.468 <.0001 -0.094 0.178 0.086 0.149 
tramak_h 0.176 0.003 -0.172 <.0001 0.204 <.0001 -0.469 <.0001 
tramak_t -0.081 0.073 1.205 <.0001 -0.056 0.254 -0.094 0.008 
tramak_c 0.180 0.006 -0.209 <.0001 0.079 0.228 -0.200 0.021 
catpcd_1 0.356 0.014 0.798 <.0001 0.022 0.820 -0.617 0.003 
catpcd_2 0.457 0.023 -0.548 0.003 0.307 0.023 -0.334 0.019 
vehcc_s -0.031 0.879 -0.237 0.147 -0.028 0.879 -0.512 0.008 
channel_D -0.002 0.913 -0.688 0.006 -0.007 0.801 -0.341 0.011 
channel_R -0.082 0.213 0.439 0.012 -0.069 0.277 0.397 0.010 
channel_T 0.019 0.233 -0.511 0.006 0.013 0.201 -0.486 <.0001 
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channel_L -0.071 0.308 -0.398 0.017 -0.054 0.429 -0.217 0.020 
channel_F 0.009 0.879 -0.487 0.021 0.011 0.711 -0.610 0.005 
channel_A -0.121 0.137 -0.508 0.010 -0.175 0.168 -0.113 0.042 
y_2000 0.217 0.781 -1.021 <.0001 0.303 0.500 0.998 <.0001 
y_2001 0.268 0.645 1.130 <.0001 0.191 0.712 0.716 <.0001 
y_2002 0.277 0.598 -1.044 <.0001 0.301 0.511 0.823 <.0001 
y_2003 0.262 0.523 -1.211 <.0001 0.198 0.698 0.645 <.0001 
y_2004 0.227 0.618 1.037 <.0001 0.288 0.516 0.811 <.0001 
y_2005 0.213 0.790 -1.002 <.0001 0.192 0.689 0.930 <.0001 
y_2006 0.298 0.433 -0.581 <.0001 0.411 0.322 0.752 <.0001 
     
Hausman test 2.83 1.97 2.07 1.33 
Note : In model (1), we estimate the conditional correlation between total theft claim and the 
contract coverage replacement cost endorsement. 
In model (2), we estimate the conditional correlation between total theft claim and the 
contract coverage no-deductible endorsement. 
We applied the Hausman test and did not reject the random effect model. The computed 
chi-square statistics are reported in the table. 
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Appendix E: Complete empirical results of the 12
th
 policy month of Model (1’), and the 1st 
policy month of Model (2’) 
 
Variables 
12
th
 policy month in model (1’) 1st policy month in model (2’) 
1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 
 Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value 
Intercept -17.253 0.890 -0.875 <.0001 -18.772 0.845 -0.766 <.0001 
clm_hat   2.836 0.524   5.448 0.481 
clm_1   15.000 0.025   9.276 0.018 
clm*Buscyc   -0.148 0.038   -0.093 0.016 
sexf -0.065 0.087 0.011 <.0001 -0.138 <.0001 -0.861 0.421 
marria_ 0.067 0.290 -0.537 <.0001 -0.037 0.547 -0.190 0.536 
age1 4.402 0.001 -12.562 0.145 3.379 0.995 22.629 0.362 
age2 4.241 0.003 -11.727 0.907 3.085 0.995 21.096 0.436 
age3 3.957 0.007 -10.872 0.644 2.852 0.996 19.963 0.489 
age4 3.978 0.007 -10.929 0.670 2.883 0.996 20.050 0.484 
age5 -0.997 0.999 2.345 0.921 2.809 0.996 20.099 0.491 
carage0 0.673 0.011 -1.394 <.0001 0.285 <.0001 1.296 0.550 
carage1 0.377 0.002 -0.907 <.0001 0.257 <.0001 1.101 0.573 
carage2 0.233 0.004 -0.720 <.0001 0.256 <.0001 1.133 0.562 
carage3 -0.032 0.771 0.007 <.0001 0.200 0.006 1.028 0.505 
carage4 0.171 0.070 -0.609 <.0001 0.157 0.045 0.494 0.677 
city 0.100 0.009 -0.425 <.0001 0.083 0.041 0.415 0.517 
north -0.143 0.003 1.472 <.0001 -0.295 0.000 -1.507 0.508 
south 0.045 0.340 -0.594 <.0001 -0.089 0.055 -0.554 0.430 
east -0.327 0.093 -0.011 <.0001 -0.060 0.591 -0.389 0.458 
tramak_n -0.021 0.943 0.868 <.0001 -5.230 0.988 -34.947 0.997 
tramak_f -0.058 0.386 -0.038 <.0001 -0.094 0.178 -0.477 0.521 
tramak_h 0.176 0.003 -1.222 <.0001 0.204 <.0001 1.230 0.440 
tramak_t -0.081 0.073 0.940 <.0001 -0.056 0.254 -0.445 0.332 
tramak_c 0.180 0.006 -0.491 0.017 0.079 0.228 0.387 0.502 
catpcd_1 0.356 0.014 0.836 <.0001 0.022 0.820 -0.745 0.002 
catpcd_2 0.457 0.023 -0.620 <.0001 0.307 0.023 -0.869 <.0001 
vehcc_s -0.031 0.879 -0.125 <.0001 -0.028 0.879 -0.238 <.0001 
channel_D -0.002 0.913 -0.701 0.001 -0.007 0.801 -0.544 0.002 
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channel_R -0.082 0.213 0.537 0.007 -0.069 0.277 0.312 0.011 
channel_T 0.019 0.233 -0.562 0.007 0.013 0.201 -0.076 0.065 
channel_L -0.071 0.308 -0.427 0.010 -0.054 0.429 -0.297 0.114 
channel_F 0.009 0.879 -0.672 0.006 0.011 0.711 -0.581 0.003 
channel_A -0.121 0.137 -0.629 0.005 -0.175 0.168 -0.267 0.218 
y_2000 0.217 0.781 -1.345 <.0001 0.303 0.500 0.839 <.0001 
y_2001 0.268 0.645 1.394 <.0001 0.191 0.712 0.764 <.0001 
y_2002 0.277 0.598 -1.907 <.0001 0.301 0.511 1.011 <.0001 
y_2003 0.262 0.523 -1.720 <.0001 0.198 0.698 0.876 <.0001 
y_2004 0.227 0.618 1.007 <.0001 0.288 0.516 0.882 <.0001 
y_2005 0.213 0.790 -1.609 <.0001 0.192 0.689 0.988 <.0001 
y_2006 0.298 0.433 -0.425 <.0001 0.411 0.322 1.032 <.0001 
     
Hausman test 2.83 2.05 2.07 1.98 
Note : In model (1’), we estimate the conditional correlation between total theft claim and the 
contract coverage replacement cost endorsement. 
In model (2’), we estimate the conditional correlation between total theft claim and the 
contract coverage no-deductible endorsement. 
We applied the Hausman test and did not reject the random effect model. The computed 
chi-square statistics are reported in the table. 
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Table 1  Definitions of variables 
Variable  Definition  
claim_jkit 
A variable that equals 1 when policy-holder_i has filed a k-type theft claim 
in the j-th month during the policy year t, j=1 to 12, k=t or p, (t means total 
theft, and p means partial theft), and 0 otherwise. 
cvrgcd_H 
A variable that equals 1 when the theft insurance contract has a 
replacement cost endorsement, and 0 otherwise. 
cvrgcd_HH 
A variable that equals 1 when the theft insurance contract is a 
no-deductible contract, and 0 otherwise. 
sexf A variable that equals 1 if the insured is female, and 0 otherwise. 
marria_ A variable that equals 1 if the insured is married, and 0 otherwise. 
Age2025 
A variable that equals 1 if the insured is between the ages of 20 and 25, and 
0 otherwise. 
age2530 
A variable that equals 1 if the insured is between the ages of 25 and 30, and 
0 otherwise. 
age3060 
A variable that equals 1 if the insured is between the ages of 30 and 60, and 
0 otherwise. 
age6070 
A variable that equals 1 if the insured is between the ages of 60 and 70, and 
0 otherwise. 
ageabove70 A variable that equals 1 if the insured is over 70 years old, and 0 otherwise. 
carage0 
A variable that equals 1 when the car is under one year old, and 0 
otherwise. 
carage1 A variable that equals 1 when the car is one year old, and 0 otherwise. 
carage2 A variable that equals 1 when the car is two years old, and 0 otherwise. 
carage3 A variable that equals 1 when the car is three years old, and 0 otherwise. 
carage4 A variable that equals 1 when the car is four years old, and 0 otherwise. 
city 
A variable that equals 1 when the owner of the car lives in a city, and 0 
otherwise. 
North 
A variable that equals 1 when the car is registered in the north of Taiwan, 
and 0 otherwise. 
south 
A variable that equals 1 when the car is registered in the south of Taiwan, 
and 0 otherwise. 
east 
A variable that equals 1 when the car is registered in the east of Taiwan, 
and 0 otherwise. 
tramak_q A variable that equals 1 when the vehicle is brand q, q=n, f, h, t, c, and 0 
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otherwise. 
catpcd_1 
A variable that equals 1 when the car is a sedan and is for non-commercial 
or for long-term rental purposes, and 0 otherwise. 
catpcd_2 
A variable that equals 1 when the vehicle is a small freight truck used for 
non-commercial purposes, and 0 otherwise 
vehcc_s 
A variable that equals 1 when the insured car has an engine capacity that  
is 2000 c.c. or less, and 0 otherwise. 
channel_m 
A variable that equals 1 when the policy is sold through the m channel, 
m=D, R, T, L, F, A, and 0 otherwise. 
year_t 
A variable that equals 1 when the data belong to the policy year n, t=2000 
to 2006, and 0 otherwise. 
Note: (1) Both the variables cvrgcd_H and cvrgcd_HH use the contracts with a deductible and with depreciation as the reference 
group. 
(2)  The reference group of variables age2025 to ageabove70 is the group of insured whose age is under 20. 
(3)  The reference group of variables from carage0 to carage4 is the group of cars over four years old. 
(4)  The reference group for the three variables of area includes the cars registered in central Taiwan. 
(5)  The reference group for the policy year variables is the group of data from the policy year 2007. 
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Table 2  Descriptive statistics  
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
cvrgcd_H 0.3292 0.4699 
cvrgcd_HH 0.0248 0.1554 
sexf 0.6255 0.4840 
marria_ 0.9123 0.2828 
age2025 0.0091 0.0949 
age2530 0.0639 0.2446 
age3060 0.8797 0.3253 
age6070 0.0410 0.1986 
ageabove70 0.0066 0.0773 
carage0 0.2070 0.3942 
carage1 0.1545 0.3694 
carage2 0.1371 0.3462 
carage3 0.1190 0.3213 
carage4 0.1014 0.2978 
city 0.5351 0.4988 
north 0.4795 0.4996 
south 0.2784 0.4482 
east 0.0229 0.1496 
tramak_n 0.0062 0.0743 
tramak_f 0.1049 0.3064 
tramak_h 0.0788 0.2585 
tramak_t 0.3929 0.4884 
tramak_c 0.0823 0.2773 
catpcd_1 0.9643 0.1817 
catpcd_2 0.0183 0.1237 
vehcc_s 0.6427 0.4792 
channel_D 0.4177 0.4971 
channel_R 0.0004 0.0201 
channel_T 0.0040 0.0594 
channel_L 0.0330 0.1417 
channel_F 0.0145 0.1224 
channel_A 0.0278 0.1726 
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Table 3  Conditional correlation between coverage and claim 
Policy 
months 
Total theft claim (k=t) Partial theft claim (k=p) 
Model (1) 
Replacement 
(l=R) 
Model (2) 
No-deductible 
(l=ND) 
Model (3) 
Replacement 
(l=R) 
Model (4) 
No-deductible 
(l=ND) 
1st policy month 
(j=1) 
0.287 
(0.221) 
0.894 
(0.022) 
0.213 
(0.211) 
0.097 
(0.623) 
2nd policy month 
(j=2) 
0.301 
(0.192) 
0.507 
(0.040) 
0.165 
(0.332) 
0.209 
(0.301) 
3rd policy month 
(j=3) 
0.141 
(0.541) 
0.389 
(0.079) 
0.194 
(0.272) 
0.174 
(0.283) 
4th policy month 
(j=4) 
0.230 
(0.188) 
0.198 
(0.299) 
0.091 
(0.609) 
0.097 
(0.531) 
5th policy month 
(j=5) 
0.092 
(0.681) 
0.168 
(0.395) 
0.062 
(0.478) 
0.109 
(0.238) 
6th policy month 
(j=6) 
0.523 
(0.023) 
0.114 
(0.422) 
0.097 
(0.581) 
0.074 
(0.652) 
7th policy month 
(j=7) 
0.965 
(<0.0001) 
0.138 
(0.321) 
0.100 
(0.270) 
0.039 
(0.884) 
8th policy month 
(j=8) 
0.683 
(0.002) 
0.045 
(0.761) 
0.081 
(0.613) 
0.052 
(0.688) 
9th policy month 
(j=9) 
0.731 
(0.003) 
0.039 
(0.812) 
0.122 
(0.297) 
0.189 
(0.258) 
10th policy month 
(j=10) 
0.552 
(0.019) 
0.005 
(0.974) 
0.013 
(0.899) 
0.047 
(0.768) 
11th policy month 
(j=11) 
1.356 
(<0.0001) 
0.094 
(0.592) 
0.057 
(0.682) 
0.005 
(0.923) 
12th policy month 
(j=12) 
1.703 
(<0.0001) 
0.211 
(0.228) 
0.079 
(0.672) 
0.075 
(0.691) 
Note: The P-values are in parentheses. All the values displayed in the above table are the estimated coefficients of 
jlc ,, . We test the conditional correlation between coverage and claim by jlc ,, . For each policy month (j, 
j=1~12), we estimate the conditional correlation between claim (k, k=t represents total theft claim; k=p represents 
partial theft claim) and contract coverage (l, l=R represents replacement cost endorsement; l=ND represents 
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no-deductible contract) by the two stage method. In model (1), we estimate the conditional correlation between 
total theft claims and the coverage of contracts with replacement cost endorsement. In model (2), we estimate the 
conditional correlation between total theft claims and the coverage of contracts with no-deductible endorsement. In 
model (3), we estimate the conditional correlation between partial theft claims and the coverage of contracts with 
replacement cost endorsement. In model (4), we estimate the conditional correlation between partial theft claims 
and the coverage of contracts with no-deductible endorsement. 
When we conducted a two-stage conditional correlation analysis on the above 48 pairs, we applied the Hausman 
test to each of the 96 regressions. In all cases, the results do not reject the random effect model. 
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Table 4  Relationship between opportunistic fraud and the business cycle 
         —the panel data model 
Policy 
months 
Model (1’) 
replacement (l=R) 
Model (2’) 
no-deductible (l=ND) 
Coefficient jlC ,,  Coefficient jlBC ,,  Coefficient jlC ,,  Coefficient jlBC ,,  
1st policy month 
(j=1) 
0.203 
(0.962) 
-0.003 
(0.946) 
9.276 
(0.018) 
-0.093 
(0.016) 
2nd policy month 
(j=2) 
2.073 
(0.656) 
-0.018 
(0.695) 
14.667 
(0.065) 
-0.153 
(0.062) 
3rd policy month 
(j=3) 
3.013 
(0.561) 
-0.030 
(0.565) 
6.171 
(0.213) 
-0.064 
(0.207) 
4th policy month 
(j=4) 
4.924 
(0.347) 
-0.053 
(0.314) 
6.348 
(0.261) 
-0.065 
(0.260) 
5th policy month 
(j=5) 
2.947 
(0.526) 
-0.030 
(0.515) 
3.139 
(0.256) 
-0.033 
(0.221) 
6th policy month 
(j=6) 
3.019 
(0.541) 
-0.033 
(0.511) 
8.242 
(0.293) 
-0.088 
(0.274) 
7th policy month 
(j=7) 
2.706 
(0.614) 
-0.030 
(0.573) 
2.621 
(0.460) 
-0.023 
(0.461) 
8th policy month 
(j=8) 
0.552 
(0.924) 
-0.007 
(0.908) 
1.952 
(0.562) 
-0.018 
(0.596) 
9th policy month 
(j=9) 
5.540 
(0.375) 
-0.052 
(0.407) 
2.222 
(0.619) 
-0.023 
(0.629) 
10th policy month 
(j=10) 
11.620 
(0.063) 
-0.125 
(0.093) 
2.140 
(0.692) 
-0.023 
(0.680) 
11th policy month 
(j=11) 
13.658 
(0.050) 
-0.145 
(0.040) 
1.216 
(0.666) 
-0.009 
(0.737) 
12th policy month 
(j=12) 
15.000 
(0.025) 
-0.148 
(0.038) 
0.707 
(0.871) 
-0.007 
(0.879) 
Note: P-values are in parentheses. All the values displayed above are the estimated coefficients of jlC ,,  and 
jlBC ,, . We test the conditional correlation between coverage and claim by jlC ,, . We test the correlation 
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between opportunistic fraud and the business cycle by jlBC ,, . For each policy month (j, j=1~12), we 
estimate the condition correlation between claim (We test only for total theft claim here, hence k=t only.) and 
contract coverage (l, l=R represents replacement cost endorsement; l=ND represents no-deductible contract) 
using the two-stage method. In model (1’), we estimate the conditional correlation between total theft claim 
and the coverage of contracts with replacement cost endorsement. In model (2’), we estimate the conditional 
correlation between total theft claims and the coverage of contract with no-deductible endorsement. 
     When we conducted the two-stage conditional correlation analysis on the above 24 pairs, we applied the 
Hausman test to each of the 48 regressions. In all cases, the results do not reject the random effect model. 
